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ALIMONY AND THE INCOME TAX
BACKGROUND AND EFFECT OF THE PROVISIONS IN THE
REVENUE ACT OF 1942t
ALAN L. GORNICK
The provisions of the Revenue Act of 1942 relating to the treatment for
income tax purposes of alimony and separate maintenance payments are revo-
lutionary in the sense that this is the first time in the history of the income
tax that Congress has legislated directly upon the matter.' The provisions
represent a major operation. By them Congress intended to establish a uni-
form rule for the taxation of any and all payments received by a divorced
wife in the nature of or in lieu of alimony; and, generally, "to treat such
payments as income to the spouse actually receiving or actually entitled to
receive them."'2 To accomplish this end, Congress necessarily had to make
sweeping changes in the existing law dealing with the income tax treatment
of the various means (such as trusts, annuities, life insurance settlements, etc.)
usually employed by husbands to discharge their obligations to support their
former wives. Like so many statutes which are the outgrowth of complications
arising out of court decisions, tle new provisions require a familiarity with
the decisions which led the legislature to enact them. Consequently, in the
interest of clarity and understanding, the background will be reviewed briefly,
against which the new provisions may be silhouetted and their scope and effect
determined.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Direct Alimony Payments
In 1917, in the case of Gould v. Gould,3 the Supreme Court held that
alimony payments made directly to a divorced wife by her former husband
pursuant to a court decree were not taxable as "income" to her under the
Income Tax Act of 1913.4 The opinion of the Court, rendered by Mr. Justice
McReynolds, appeared to consider that because of the husband's legal and
tThe writer gratefully'acknowledges the helpful suggestions of Harrison Tweed, Esq.
'The provisions were adopted as Section 120 of The Revenue Act of 1942 E56 STAT.
816, 26 U. S. C. §§ 22(b)(2), 22(k), 23(u), 25(b) (2) (A), 171(a) and (b), 3797(a)
(QSupp. 1942)], amending various provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. Certain
proposals were made by the Senate Finance Committee in this respect in its report on
the Revenue Act of 1941 [SEN. REP. No. 673, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 11, 32], but
they were laid aside for later consideration. 87 CONG. R.EC. 7418, 7421 (1941).2 SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 83; H. R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1942) 71.
3245 U. S. 151, 38 Sup. Ct. 53 (1917).
438 STAT. 114, 166, c. 16 (1913).
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moral obligation to support his wife, alimony merely represented her equitable
portion of his estate. The Court relied upon the somewhat questionable
precedent of Audubon v.'Shufeldt,5 which held that a claim for alimony does
not constitute a provable debt in bankruptcy. In all probability, however, the
motivating influence for the decision in the Gould case was the fact that any
other determination would have led to double taxation, for the Court speci-
fically pointed out that under the statute the husband was not allowed a
deduction for such payments and, consequently, that his net income "subject
to taxation was not decreased by payment of alimony under the court's order." 6
Whatever the basis for the decision, however, it established the basic rule
consistently adhered to thereafter that direct alimony payments made to a
divorced wife under a decree of court are not taxable as income to her.
B. Alimony Trusts
No trust or other agreement was involved in the Gould case, and, therefore,
the question still remained open as to whether the income from alimony trusts,
or allowances under a separation agreement, should be treated differently
from outright alimony. The Board of Tax Appeals and the Commissioner
found no difficulty in following the decision so far as direct payments under a
separation agreement were concerned. 7 Since the revenue laws provided a
specific plan for the taxation of trusts under which distributable income was
taxable to the beneficiaries,8 the problem with respect to alimony trusts was
complicated by the question of whether the income from them should be
treated as ordinary trust income or as alimony. For some twenty years after
the Gould case the Treasury 9 and the lower courts1 ° struggled with this prob-
5181 U. S. 575, 21 Sup. Ct. 735 (1901)
6245 U. S. 151, 154, 38 Sup. Ct. 53, 53 (1917).
7Jane B. Coates, 3 B.T.A. 429 (1926); Acq. V-1 Cum. BULL. 2 (1926); cf. Commis-.
sioner of Corporations, etc. v. Dalton, 304 Mass. 147, 23 N. E. (2d) 147 (1939).
8Presently contained in §§ 161 and 162 of the Internal Revenue Code. 53 STAT. 66
(1939), 26 U. S. C. §§ 161 and 162 (1940). Corresponding prior law sections are §§ 161
and 162 of the Revenue Acts of 1936, 1934, 1932, and 1928, and § 219 (a) and (b) of the
Revenue Acts of 1926 and 1924.
9The Treasury in 1920 ruled that income from an alimony trust was taxable to the
husband. 0. D. 399, 2 Cuam. BULL. 156 (1920). A year later it revoked this ruling
and stated that such income was taxable to the wife. 0. D. 1092, 5 Cum. BULL. 190
(1921). Still later it returned to its earlier position and again ruled such income tax-
able to the husband on the ground that he was the true trust beneficiary. I. T. 2628,
XI-1 CUM. BULL. 34 (1931).
"0The Board of Tax Appeals and the courts adopted a distinction. Such income was
held not taxable to the husband where he retained no interest in the trust principal except
a remote reversionary one. S. A. Lynch, 23 B. T. A. 435 (1931), review petition di,-
missed, Feb. 5, 1932 (C. C. A. 5th). But where there was no irrevocable transfer of
ownership, and the trust was established merely as collateral security, the husband was
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lem. The conflict finally reached the Supreme Court in 1935 and the lengthy,
but, unfortunately, not lucid, opinion in Douglas v. Willcuts" was the result.
Applying the broad and elastic principle of constructive receipt' 2 to the par-
ticular facts before it, the Court held the income of the alimony trust created
by Mr. Douglas for the support of his divorced wife taxable to him. In doing
so it stated that it did "not regard the provisions of the statutes as to the
taxation of trusts" as intended "to apply to cases where the income of the
trust would otherwise remain, by virtue of the nature and purpose of the
trust, attributable to the creator of the trust and accordingly taxable to him."' 3
The Court apparently did not hold that the income from all alimony trusts
should be taxable to the husband, but rather limited taxation to him of
income from trusts which he might be deemed to have constructively received.
Trouble immediately arose, therefore, because this elastic doctrine of con-
structive receipt could be given certainty only when translated into the
combination of factors present in the Do-uglas case, namely, (1) a legal obli-
gation imposed on a husband by local law to support his divorced wife, (2)
incorporation of the trust agreement into the divorce decree, and (3) con-
tinuing jurisdiction in the court to revise its decree or the trust instrument,
and, therefore, a continuing obligation on the part of the husband to pay
alimony. A fourth factor, a provision in the trust instrument whereby the
husband was to make up any deficiency in income should such income fall
below the amount specified, was present but not specifically relied upon by the
Supreme Court, although emphasized in later decisions of the lower courts.' 4
The difficulties of the latter arose when one or more of these factors were
absent, and their decisions necessarily often resulted in a process of factual
addition and subtraction. 15 Fundamentally, confusion ensued because the
case left open the vital question of whether income from an alimony trust,
was taxable to the hUsband only when there was a continuing obligation under
held taxable. Frank Turner, 28 B. T. A. 91 (1933), aff'd, 71 F. (2d) 1018 (C. C. A.
2d, 1934) ; John M. Longyear, Jr., 28 B. 1. A. 1086 (1933), aff'd, 77 F. (2d) 116 (App.
D. C. 1935) ; cf. Arthur H. Van Brunt, 11 B. T. A. 406 (1928).
"1296 U. S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 59 (1935).
'2The Court cited Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioier, 279 U. S. 716, 49 Sup. Ct.
499 (1929) (income taxes of employee paid by employer) and United States v. Boston
and M. R. Co., 279 U. S. 732, 49 Sup. Ct. 505 (1929) (income taxes of lessor paid by
lessee).
13296 U. S. 1, 9, 56 Sup. Ct. 59, 63 (1935).
' 4Alsop v. Commissioner, 92 F. (2d) 148 (C. C. A. 3d, 1937); Glendinning v. Com-
missioner, 97 F. (2d) 51 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938) ; Cap. Andrew Tilles, 38 B. T. A. 545
(1938) ; E. T. Weir, 39 B. T. A. 400 (1939).
' 5 See, generally, Paul, Five Years with. Douglas v. Willcuts (1939) 53 HARv. L. RaV.
1; Note (1939) 52 HARV. L. REV. 804.
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local law to pay alimony, or was always taxable to him by virtue of the crea-
tion of the trust, which may or may not have completely discharged his
obligation to support.
After the lower courts had struggled with the confusing doctrine of the
Douglas case for about five years, the Supreme Court again considered the
problem in the related cases of Helvering v. Fitch,16 Helzering v. Fuller,"7
and Helvering v. Leonard.18
In the Fitch case, which involved an Iowa divorce,' the majority of the
court by interpretation limited the Douglas case to the principle that income
from an alimony trust is taxable to the husband only when it is used to dis-
charge a "continuing obligation" of the taxpayer "to support his divorced
wife."20 It held that a husband, in order to sustain "the burden of establishing
that his case falls outside the general rule expressed in Douglas v. Willcuts"
must produce "clear and convincing proof" that "local law and the alimony
trust have given the divorced husband a full discharge and leave no continuing
obligation however contingent. ' 21 After making an independent examination
of the law of Iowa, the Court declared that it was not convinced that the Iowa
-courts were without power "to modify alimony awarded in a lump sum or a
property settlement ratified by a divorce decree" 22 and, accordingly, held that
Mr. Fitch remained taxable on the income of the trust. I
In the Fuller case, the Supreme Court applied the rule of the Fitch case
and held that the husband had shown that the local law (Nevada) there
involvedand the trust instrument gave him a full discharge and imposed no
-continuing obligation upon him. 23 The Court, after reviewing the Nevada
16309 U. S. 149, 60 Sup. Ct. 427 (1940).
17310 U. S. 69, 60 Sup. Ct. 784 (1940).
18310 U. S. 80, 60 Sup. Ct. 780 (1940).
'1The alimony trust in question was created a few years before the divorce while the
taxpayer and his wife were separated and in settlement of a suit by her for separate
maintenance. Certain premises (a hair tonic factory and a long-term lease thereon)
were transferred to a trustee under provisions to pay the wife $600 a month for her life
and the balance to the grantor-husband for his life. In 1925 the wife filed suit for divorce
in an Iowa court. A property settlement was agreed upon which included the trust
agreement and, in addition, provided for a transfer to her by her husband of cash and
certain shares of stock of F. W. Fitch Co. The divorce decree confirmed the property
and alimony settlement. The claim of the Commissioner, to the effect that the income
distributed in 1933 under the terms of this trust to the divorced wife should have been
included in the husband's taxable income for that year, was sustained by the Supreme
Court, Mr. Justice McReynolds dissenting.
20309 U. S. 149, 152, 60 Sup. Ct. 427, 428 (1940).211d. at 156, 60 Sup. Ct. at 430 (1940).221d. at 155, 60 Sup. Ct. at 430 (1940).
23Briefly stated, it appeared that the taxpayer and his wife, residing in Connecticut,
entered into an agreement on July 25, 1930, in contemplation of divorce, which provided,
among other things, for the creation by him of a trust of certain shares of stock of the
1943]
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cases, expressed the opinion that the Nevada court retained no power to alter
or modify the divorce decree. It also found that the trust agreement itself
imposed no "continuing obligation" on the husband because he did not "under-
write the principal or income from the trust or any part thereof or make any
commitments, contingent or otherwise, respecting them."2 4 Accordingly, the
majority held that the income from this trust was taxable to the wife.25
In the Leonard case, a majority of the Court applied the rule of the Fitch
case and held that the taxpayer had not shown that the laws of New York
there involved and the trust instrument gave him a full discharge and imposed
no continuing obligation upon him. By the trust instrument, executed by the
husband as an incident to the divorce subsequently obtained by his wife in
New York, he guaranteed the payment when due of the principal and interest
of certain bonds of an oil company comprising part of the corpus of the
trust.26 Mr. Justice Douglas, who wrote the opinion for the majority of the
Court, after a review of the New York cases, thought the husband had not
established by "clear and convincing proof" that the settlement could not be
modified by the courts of New York. Even though wrong in this respect, he
thought the husband "clearly taxable" on "that portion of the trust income
'which was received from the guaranteed bonds" because the guarantee was a
"continuing obligation. '27 Mr. Justice Reed concurred in the result while the
Fuller Brush Company. The trust was to be irrevocable and was to continue for ten
years, upon the expiration of which the principal was to be transferred to her outright.
The wife repaired to Reno, Nevada, and obtained a divorce decree on November 12, 1930,
,which approved the agreement referred to. On December 22, 1930, the divorced husband
created the trust provided for in the agreement.
24310 U. S. 69, 73, 60 Sup. Ct. 784, 787 (1940).25Mr. Justice Reed in a separate dissenting opinion took the view that the husband
should be taxed upon the income. In his opinion continuing liability was not the real
basis for the decision in Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U. S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 59 (1935)_, but
rather "the prior appropriation, by the creation of the trust, of future income to meet an
obligation of the taxpayer." Accordingly, in his view, it made no difference whether the
creation of the trust did or did not discharge the husband's duty to support.2 6
1t appeared that in 1928 the wife instifuted a suit in New York for an absolute
divorce. On June 4, 1929, while that suit was pending, the husband and his wife entered
into h separation agreement and executed a trust agreement. Under the latter the hus-
band contributed certain cash and securities which included $400,000 principal amount of
six per cent First Mortgage bonds of an oil company. The husband guaranteed the
"payment when due of the principal and interest" on those bonds. The net income of
the trust was to be paid $5,000 a year to each of three children and the remainder to
the wife during her life for her maintenance and support. The separation agreement
incorporated the trust agreement by reference and, among other things, provided for the
husband to pay his wife an additional, $35,000 a year during her life. The decree of
divorce became final in October, 1929. It "approved and affirmed and made a part of
the judgment herein" the separation agreement (which incorporated the trust agreement)
and in addition directed the husband to pay the wife $35,000 a3 year for her life.
27310 U. S. 80, 84, 60 Sup. Ct. 780, 783 (1940).
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Chief Justice, Mr. Justice McReynolds, and Mr. Justice Roberts were "of the
opinion that the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals" which held that
the husband had no continuing obligation either under local law or the trust
instrument, 28 should be "affirmed."
The continuing obligation theory thus established by the Supreme Court
in the Fitch, Fidler, and Leonard cases had numerous bad aspects.29 In order
to determine who was taxable upon the income from an alimony trust, it was
necessary first to decide whether the husband had (1) a "continuing obliga-
tion" to support his divorced wife either under (a) "local law" or (b) "the
trust instrument." The concept of a "continuing obligation" in the first place
was inherently indefinite, obscure, and confusing. For example, although
the majority of the Supreme Court held otherwise, the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, and, apparently, at least three justices of the
Supreme Court itself, did not think that the guaranteed payment of principal
and interest in the Leonard case was a "continuing obligation."
In the second place, the existence of this indefinite concept was itself de-
pendent upon local law which in most cases was equally, if not more, obscure,
indefinite, and difficult of ascertainment. 0
2105 F. (2d) 900 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
29See, generally, Lowndes, Commmcity Income and Alinwny (1941) 20 TAXES 3;
Gornick, Taxation of Alimony Truts-A Need for Congressional Reform (1942) 20
TAXES 529.3OParticularly revealing in this respect, is the story of the trials and tribulations of
Mr. Fitch subsequent to the Supreme Court decision in his case holding that he had not
shown by "clear and convincing" proof that the law of Iowa imposed no "continuing
obligation" upon him to support his wife. After that decision Mr. Fitch took the only
avenue of escape seemingly left open to him-he filed a petition on May 7, 1940, in the
District Court of the State of Iowa in and for Polk County, asking the court to modify
the divorce decree entered on December 17, 1925. He stated that since that date his
property and assets had diminished in value and "become impressed with a far greatet
burden than originally existed" because "for the year 1933, and years subsequent thereto,
the United States Commissioner of Internal Revenue has determined that income of the
aforesaid trust payable to the plaintiff, pursuant to the terms thereof, is constructively
the income of the defendant in that said income is discharging the defendant's continuing
obligation to support the plaintiff and that he is subject to the federal income tax thereon."
Mr. Fitch's former wife responded by filing a motion to dismiss the petition on the
ground that it showed "on its face that the decree of divorce entered herein was a final
adjudication of all marital and property rights between these parties" and that the court
retained no jurisdiction "either for the purpose of reallocating the income of the trust
referred to or to redistribute any of the property involved in the settlement." The court
sustained the motion to dismiss, declaring that under the law of Iowa it was without
power "to modify, amend or change the decree of divorce entered herein or to reallocate
the income of the trust referred to." This action of the district court was affirmed by
the supreme court of Iowa on November 12, 1940. Fitch v. Fitch, 229 Iowa 349, 294
N. W. 577 (1940). The court severely criticized the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of the law of Iowa declaring that it was "of the opinion that this question
has been considered, by the bench and bar of this state, fairly well settled," and that "as
we read our decisions, we can find little room for doubt as to the attitud6 we have here-
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( Not only did the rule of the Fitch, Fuller, and Leonard cases impose an
appalling interpretative burden upon taxpayers, but it also led to unjustifiable
dis.crimination between taxpayers. First, it discriminated between men like
Mr. Fitch, who were financially able to create trusts and thus avoid paying a
tax on the alimony paid to their divorced wives, and men who were financially
unable to create trusts, and, consequently, were required to pay the tax on
the $20, $30, or $50 weekly alimony paid by them out of their earnings
directly to their divorced wives. Second, it destroyed any uniformity in the
taxation of alimony trusts, for, under it, even in the same jurisdiction, some
were taxable and others were not, depending up6n the skill with which the
draftsmen avoided incorporating any vestige of a "continuing obligation, how-
ever contingent" into them.31 Third, the rule discriminated between taxpayers
of different states, for in some states an alimony trust could be created which
would discharge a husband's future obligations, while in others it could not.
2
tofore taken in reference to this question." Mr. Fitch's troubles, however, were not yet
over. Despite the Iowa decision, the Commissioner determined that Mr. Fitch was
taxable on the income of the trust received by his divorced wife on the ground that the
decision of the United States Supreme Court, relating to similar income for the year 1933,
made the question as to income for subsequent years res judicata. A merciful Board of
Tax Appeals, however, held to the contrary (F. W. Fitch, 43 B. T. A. 773 (1941)] and
the Government finally acquiesced. 1941-1 Cum. BULL. 4.
SlAs Mr. Justice Reed in his diisenting 'opinion in the Fuller case aptly put it:
"We are now at the point where the taxability of the settlor depends not only on
the 'clear and convincing proof' of the finality of the decree but the ability to produce
that proof depends upon the skill of the draftsman of the settlement. Fine distinc-
tions are necessary in reasoning but most undesirable in a national tax system."
310 U. S. 69, 78, 60 Sup. Ct. 784, 789 (1940).
352 t was held that a divorce obtained in the following states relieved a husband from
any further obligation to support his former wife; and, therefore, that the income of an
alimony trust created as an incident thereto was taxable to the wife: Arizona-Melville
H. Haskell, 46 B. T. A. 592 (1942) ; Comwcticut-Ingraham v. Commissioner, 119 F.
(2d) 223 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941) ; Illinois-William H. Stanley, 41 B. T. A. 1233 (1940) ;
Maiwe-Susan Sturgis Barry, 42 B. T. A. 592 (1942); Nevada-Helvering v. Fuller,
310 U. S. 69, 60 Sup. Ct. 784 (1920) ; Ohio-Henry M. Lucas, 44 B. T. A. 213 (1941) ;
Oregon-Commissioner v. Nicolai, 126 F. (2d) 927 (C. C. A. 9th, 1942) ; Pennsylvania-
Dixon v. Commissioner, 109 F. (2d) 984 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940) ; Texas-Ernestine Mitchell,
38 B. T. A. 1336 (1938) ; cf. Pearce v. Commissioner, 315 U. S. 543, 62 Sup. Ct. 754
(1942).
On the other hand, it was held that a divorce obtained in the following states, did not
relieve a husband from any further obligation to support, and, therefore, that he remained
taxable upon the income of such a trust: California-Murray Innes, 42 B. T. A. 93
(1940) ; contra after remarriage of the wife, Murray Brookman, 41 B. T. A. 557 (1940) ;
Iow-Helvering v. Fitch, 309 U. S. 149, 60 Sup. Ct. 427 (1940) ; but see the subsequent
history of this case, note 30 spra; Michigan-Thompson v. Kavanaugh, 36 F. Supp. 263
(E. D. Mich. 1941); New York-Helvering v. Leonard, 310 U. S. 80, 60 Sup. Ct. 780
(1940). Similarly, as to French divorce, see Havemeyer v. Helvering, 121 F. (2d) 454
(C. C. A. 2d, 1941); and as to Latvian divorce before remarriage, see Reginald B.
Parsons, 44 B. T. A. 1142 (1941).
Even though the local law relieved the husband from any further obligation to support,,
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Thus two trusts, precisely alike in every respect, drawn for the purpose of
providing maintenance and support for a former wife, had different tax results
depending upon the state of residence of the respective settlors or, at least,
upon the state where the divorce was obtained. In this respect, if income taxes
were of predominant importance, prospective divorcees were encouraged to
migrate to states such as Nevada where the finality of the settlement was
clearly established.
Moreover, the taxation of alimony trusts was further complicated by the
fact that such trusts were subject to the limitations imposed by the Internal
Revenue Code upon trusts generally. For example, even though a husband
was given a full discharge by local law and the trust instrument, he might,
nevertheless, still be held taxable upon the income paid to his divorced wife
under Section 166 of the Code if he retained a power to revest the corpus
in himself,"4 or under Section 167-5 if the income might be distributed, or held
or accumulated for future distribution to him, 6. or under Section 22(a) 
7
if he retained sufficient control to be considered the owner of the trust property
within the doctrine of Helvering v. Clifford.8 .
The situation with respect to the income taxation of alimony trusts thus
facing Congress was, indeed, a troublesome and unhappy one. The rule
improvised by the courts was confusing and unworkable. Moreover, under it
the income from some trusts was taxable to the husbands, while the income
from others was taxable to the wives. If clarity and uniformity were to be
he was nevertheless held taxable where under the terms of the trust instrument he had a
"continuing obligation" to make up deficiencies in trust income. Alsop v. Commissioner,
92 F. (2d) "148 (C. C. A. 3d, 1937) (French divorce: husband taxable notwithstanding
wife's remarriage) ; Glendinning v. Commissioner, 97 F. (2d) 51 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938)
(Pennsylvania divorce) ; Weir v. Commissioner, 109 F. (2d) 996 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940),
cert. den.. 310 U. S. 637, 60 Sup. Ct. 1080 (1940) (Pennsylvania divorce).
3353 STAT. 68 (1939), 26 U. S. C. § 166 (1940).34 Discussed generally in MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAXES ON ESTATES, TRUSTS AND GIFTS
(1943) 166; 6 MmErEs, LAW OF FEDERAL INcOmE TAXATION (1942) 311; MAGILL,
TAXABLE INCOME (1936) 274. Cf. Reinecke v. Smith, 289 U. S. 172, 53 Sup. Ct. 570
(1933) ; Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S. 376, 50 Sup. Ct. 336 (1930) ; Note (1941) 132
A. L. R. 785.
3553 STAT. 68 (1939), 26 U. S. C. § 167 (1940).36Cf. Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U. S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 59 (1935) ; Note (1936) 101 A. L. R.
397; Henry Martyn Baker, 43 B. T. A. 1029 (1941) ; Note (1941) 132 A. L. R. 819.
3753 STAT. 9, amended 53 STAT. 574 (1939), 26 U. S. C. § 2 2(a) (1940).
38309 U. S. 331, 60 Sup. Ct. 554 (1940) (short term family trust; substantial control
retained by settlor). In Helvering v. Fuller, 310 U. S. 69, 60 Sup. Ct. 784 (1940) [see
note 23 .rpra], the Supreme Court, in passing the point because it had not been advanced,
stated that the husband might also have been held taxable under the Clifford case because
he retained considerable control over the trusteed shares of stock. Cf. Frank Turner, 28
B. T. A. 91 (1933), aff'd per curiam, 71 F. (2d) 1018 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934). See, generally,
Note (1941) 132 A. L. R. 844; Pavenstedt, The Broadenwd Scope of Section 22 (a)
(1942) 51 YALE L. J. 213.
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achieved, therefore, a drastic and sweeping revision of the existing rule by
Congress was imperative.
C. Lump-Sum Settlements
No case, it seems, has ever held that in the event a husband discharges his
obligation to support his former wife by a lump-sum settlement, the amount
of the settlement is taxable as income to him, or that he will thereafter be
taxable upon the income derived from it. On the contrary, the Supreme
Court, in the Fuller case, supra, declared that if the husband "had not placed
the shares of stock in trust but had transferred them outright to his wife as
part of the property settlement,"' there would "be no doubt that income sub-
sequently accrued and 1aid thereon would be taxable to the wife, not to him."39
The income received by a wife from property so transferred to her, said the
Court, "is to be treated the same as income accruing from property after a
debtor has transferred that property to his creditor ih full satisfaction of his
obligations. '40  This general rule, however, it would seem, would not be
applicable in case the husband retained any substantial right or interest in
the property transferred, for, in such event, he might be deemed the owner
for purposes of the federal revenue laws. 41
Since a lump-sum settlement in lieu of alimony was not generally taxable
as income to the husband, would the transaction constitute a gift subject to
the gift tax? This question was answered in Commissioner v. Mesta,42 in
which it was held that a lump-sum settlement in lieu of alimony did not
constitute a gift, but was rather in the nature of a sale or exchange upon
which gain was realized.4"
D. Life Insurance, Endowment, and Annuity Contracts
Like lump-sum settlements the proceeds of life insurance, in general, paid
to a divorced wife by virtue of the death of her former husband were not
taxable as income to her. Section 22 (b) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code44
39310 U. S. 69, 74, 60 Sup. Ct. 784, 787 (1940).401d. at 75, 60 Sup. Ct. at 787.
4'Cf. Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U. S. 579, 61 Sup. Ct. 331 (1941) ; Helvering v.
Eubank, 311 U. S. 122, 61 Sup. Ct. 149 (1940) ; Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112, 61
Sup. Ct. 144 (1940) ; Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331, 60 Sup. Ct. 554 (1940).
42123 F. (2d) 986 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941), cert. den. 316 U. S. 655, 62 Sup. Ct. 1290 (1942).
Accord: Commissioner v. Halliwell, 131 F. (2d) 642 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942), cert. den.
318 U. S. -, 63 Sup. Ct. 1029 (1943) ; Herbert Jones, I. T. C. No. 160 (1943).
3The husband transferred 5200 shares of certain stock to his wife in settlement of all
claims for support. The original cost of the stock was about $7500, while its value at
the date of transfer was approximately $156,000. It was held that the difference was
taxable to the husband as capital gain..
4453 STAT. 9 (1939), 26 U. S. C. § 22 (b) (1) (1940).'
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broadly exempted all amounts received by any beneficiary under a life
insurance contract by reason of the death of the insured "whether in a single
sum or otherwise," excepting only interest on undrawn proceeds. 45
The situation, however, was different where amounts were paid other than
by reason of the death of the insured under life insurance, endowment, or
annuity contracts. Section 22 (b) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code,40 gen-
erally, provided that such payments should be taxable to the recipients to the
extent that they exceeded the premiums or other consideration theretofore
paid. The Supreme Court, in Pearce v. Commissioner,47 considered the income
tax effects of such payments made to a divorced wife in lieu of alimony. In
a divided opinion, the Court added a further refinement to the rule of the
Fitch, Fuller, and Leonard cases, and held that the appellant wife, who
obtained a divorce in Texas, was subject to tax on income received under an
annuity contract purchased for her by her husband for a lump sum from an
insurance company. The majority proceeded upon the ground that the wife
had not shown that the husband was under "a continuing contractual obliga-
tion" to support her, nor that it was "doubtful and uncertain" that the Texas
court retained control over the annuity contract.
48
E. Support of Children
It had long been established that amounts paid by a husband, by means of
a trust or otherwise, for the support of his minor children were taxable as
income to him.49 The fact that the husband and wife were, or became,
4 5The Treasury Department, by regulation [see U. S. Treas. Reg. 103 § 19.22 (b)
(1)-1], has attempted to reach proceeds payable in certain installments without apparent
success. See Allis v. La Budde, et al., 128 F. (2d) 838 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942) ; Commis-
sioner v. Buck, 120 F. (2d) 775 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941) ; Commissioner v. Winslow, 113 F.
(2d) 418 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940).
4053 STAT. 9 (1939), 26 U. S. C. § 22 (b) (2) (1940).
47315 U. S. 543, 62 Sup. Ct. 754 (1942).
481n a vigorous dissent, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, with the concurrence of the Chief
Justice, said:
"The decisions of this Court dealing with the question before us have turned upon
whether local law was uncertain as to the existence of a continuing obligation on the
part of the husband to support the wife. The opinion of the Court now introduces
another element, namely, whether the local law is uncertain as to the power of the
state courts to remake the particular settlement. This, it seems to me, has no valid
relation to the basic principle of tax liability that 'he who receives benefits should
be taxed.' Whether a husband is benefited from the payment of monies to his
divorced wife depends upon his obligation to her which the payment of the monies
served to discharge, not upon the nature of the wife's interest in the property he
has transferred to her. To introduce such an unwarranted refinement is to clog the
administration of the revenue laws." Id. at 555, 62 Sup. Ct. at 760 (1942).4 9Helvering v. Schweitzer, 296 U. S. 551, 56 Sup. Ct. 304 (1935) ; Helvering v. Stokes,
296 U. S. 551, 56 Sup. Ct. 308 (1935).
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divorced and the specified payments were made directly to her for this pur-
pose, made no difference.50 In Bok v. Rothensies,51 however, the District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania made an exception to this rule
and held that the husband was not taxable on any part of the income of. a
trust paid to a divorced wife for the support of herself and of minor children
where there was no specific designation of the portion to be used for the
support of such children.
5 2
F. Summary
The rules generally governing the income tax treatment of alimony and
separate maintenance payments at the time Congress enacted the Revenue Act
of 1942, therefore, may be summarized as follows:
(1) Direct alimony payments made to a divorced wife under a decree of
divorce, or under a separation agreement in lieu of alimony, were not taxable
as income to her but rather to her former husband.
(2) The income from an alimony trust paid to a divorced wife might be
taxable to the husband or the wife depending upon whether the husband (1)
had a "continuing obligation" under either (a) "local law" or (b) "the trust
instrument," and (2) had given up every interest in, and complete control
over, the transferred property so as to avoid the effects of Sections 166 and
167 of the Internal Revenue Code, and the doctrine of the Clifford case.
(3) A lump-sum settlement was not taxable as income to either the wife
or the husband, but the income from such a settlement thereafter was taxable
to the wife. The husband,might realize a taxable gain on the transfer.
(4) The proceeds of a life insurance policy paid by reason of the death
of the insured to his former wife were exempt from tax. Amounts so paid
other than by reason of death, under life' insurance, endowment, or annuity
contracts were taxable either to the wife or the husband depending upon
whether (1) he had a "continuing contractual obligation" to support his
former wife, or (2) local law retained control over the contract.
51Olngraham v. Commissioner, 119 F. (2d) 223 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941); Helvering v.
Leonard, 310 U, S. 80, 60 Sup. Ct. 780 (1940) (see note 26 supra) ; Longyear v. Helvering,
77 F. (2d) 116 (App. D. C. 1935); Henry Martyn Baker, 43 B. T. A. 1029 (1941).
Quaere whether this would be so if the former husband had no obligation to support the
minor children under the applicable local law. Cf. H. Cecil Sharp, 42 B. T. A. 336
(1940) ; Commissioner v. Yeiser, 75 F. (2d) 956 (C. C. A. 6th, 1935) ; Yarborough v.
Yarborough, 290 U. S. 202, 54 Sup. Ct. 181 (1933).
5143 F. Supp. 377. (E. D. Pa. 1942), aff'd per curiam November 12, 1942 (C. C. A. 3d).
52Compare Ingraham v. Commissioner, 119 F. (2d) 223 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941), which
held to the contrary on facts strikingly the same with the single exception that the settlor
provided for repayment to him out of the trust income such sums as he might be obliged
to spend for the support of the children.
[Vol. 29
ALIMONY AND THE INCOME TAX
(5) Amounts appropriated for, or paid to, a former wife for the support
of minor children were taxable to the husband, except in the case where no
specific amount was specifiedfor this purpose.
This summary reveals the confused status of, and the complete lack of
uniformity in, the income tax treatment of divorce settlements as developed
by the courts based upon settled legal analogies in the absence of any legis-
lative guideposts. It also reveals that relief from this unfortunate situation
could come only from the congressional enactment of a basic policy with
respect to alimony in its tax laws. That enactment having been made, we may
now turn to a consideration of it, and its effect on the stated rules.
II. THE PROVISIONS OF THE REVENUE ACT OF 1942
A. Direct Alimony Payments
In view of the existing wide variance in the income tax treatment of pay-
ments in the nature of, or in lieu of alimony, it was obvious that if Congress
were to achieve its aim of producing uniformity it must necessarily first enact
a broad general rule, and then amend other relevant provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code to conform to it. This first task it achieved by adding a new
subsection, designated "(k)," 53 to the end of present Section 22 of the Internal
Revenue Code (relating to the definition of gross income), which new sub-
section is entitled "Alimony, etc. Income." The general rule, which broadly
taxes alimony to the divorced wife rather than to the husband, is contained
in the complicated first sentence of this new subsection which states that
"In the case of a wife who is divorced or legally separated from her
husband under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance, periodic
payments (whether or not made at regular intervals) received subsequent
to such decree in discharge of, or attributable to property transferred (in
trust or otherwise) in discharge of, a legal obligation which, because of
the marital or family relationship, is imposed upon or incurred by such
husband under such decree or under a written instrument incident to such
divorce or separation shall be includible in the gross income of such wife,
and such amounts received as are attributable to property so transferred
shall not be includible in the gross income of such husband."
Complementing this new Section 22 (k), an amendment to Section 23 of
the Code (relating to deductions from gross income) incorporates a new
subsection, (u),54 by which the husband is allowed a deduction for payments
includible in the wife's income under Section 22-(k).
5356 STAT. 816, 26 U. S. C. § 22 (k) (Supp. 1942).
5456 STAT. 816, 26 U. S. C. § 23 (u) (Supp. 1942).
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The rule thus established completely reverses Gould v. Gould,
55 and,
accordingly, direct alimony payments hereafter made to a divorced wife are
taxable as income to the wife unddr Section 22 (k) and deductible by the
husband under Section 23 (u). It is to be noted that this treatment has also
been extended by the Act to the case of a husband and wife who are not
divorced but living separate and apart under a decree of legal separation.
The Act also reverses the existing rule in this respect.56 .
New Section, 22 (k), however, embodies many limitations to the stated
general rule, which must be carefully noted:
(1) The rule applies only in case the wife is divorced or legally separated
under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance.
Thus no change has been made in the existing rule taxing to the husband
payments made to a wife not legally separated from the husband, but living
apart from him pursuant to an informal separation agreement.57 Such cases
are frequent, of course, where religious considerations compel the parties to
forego obtaining a divorce. Congress might very well have extended the new
rule to this situation. In all probability, however, the possibility of income tax
evasion and the difficulty of disproving the bona fides of an informal separa-
tion compelled Congress to limit the rule to cases where a decree either of
divorce or of legal separation has been obtained.
Some difficulty will no doubt be experienced in determining what is meant
by a "decree." Does it mean only a decree of a court of law? Or does it
include also an act of a legislature dissolving a marriage? The nature of the
legislation, and the broad provisions of the statute would seem to compel a
conclusion that it was the intent of Congress that the word "decree" should
cover the pronoun'cement of any official tribunal authorized to dissolve a mar-
riage or specifically to sanction a legal separation.58 The same considerations
would seem to compel a conclusion that "decree" does not necessarily mean a
"final decree," and, accordingly, that the statute applies to temporary alimony
awarded to a wife by an interlocutory or other preliminary decree. The
Treasury Department in its Regulations covering the new provisions, how-
55245 U. S. 151, 38 Sup. Ct. 53 (1917).
56See note 7 supra.
5TSee note 7 and text supra.5
81t has been suggested that "decree" may be limited to mean only a decree recognized
as valid and entitled to full faith and credit under Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S.
287, 63 Sup. Ct. 207 (1943). There is no warrant for such an interpretation in the
statute. It would be regrettable if such a limitation were imposed by judicial construc-
tion, for in cases of 'this nature it would effectively lead to a transformation of the Tax
Court into a court of domestic relations.
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ever, has taken a contrary position and states that temporary alimony awarded
to a wife pending a "final decree" is not taxable to the wife.58
(2) The rule applies only to "periodic payments" received "subsequent
to such decree."
(3) The rule applies only where the legal obligation being discharged
arises out of the family or marital relationship "in recognition of the general
obligation to support, which is made specific by the instrument or decree."5
9
Thus, the section does not apply to that part of any periodic payment
attributable to any interest in the property so transferred which interest
originally belonged to the wife, unless, of course, she received it from her
husband in contemplation of, or as an incident to, the divorce or separation.
(4) The section does not apply to that part of any periodic payment
which, by the terms of the decree or the instrument, is specifically designated
as a sum payable for the support of minor children of the husband.60 More-
over, if an amount or portion is so fixed, but the amount of any periodic
payment made is actually less than the amount specified to be made, then,
to the extent of the amount which would be payable for the support of such
children out of the originally specified amount, such payment ig considered a
payment for such support. For example, if the husband is by the terms of the
decree required to pay $200 a month to his divorced wife, $100 of which is
designated by the decree to be for the support of their minor children, and
the husband pays' only $150 to his wife, $100 is nevertheless considered to
be a payment by the husband for the support of the children, and, accordingly,
taxable to him,
Although there is no specific statement to this effect in the Act, the pre-
ceding provision implies, and it was the expressed intention of Congress, that
if the periodic payments received by the wife for the support and maintenance
of herself and of minor children of the husband without specific designation
58'U. S. Treas. Reg. 103 § 19.22(K)-1, Example (1).
59H. R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 72. Similarly SEN. R Pi. No.
1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 84. Compare the statement in Douglas v. Willcuts,
296 U. S. 1, 8, 56 Sup. Ct. 59," 62 (1935): "Amounts paid to a divorced wife under
a decree for alimony are not regarded as income of the wife but as paid in dis-
charge of the general obligation to support, which is made specific by the decree."
0 Sec. 22 (k) provides:
"This subsection shall not apply to that part of any such periodic payment "jvhich
the terms of the decree or written instrument fix, in terms of an amount of money or
a portion of the payment, as a sum which is payable for the support of minor chil-
dren of such husband. In case any such periodic payment is less than the amount
specified in the decree or written instrument, for the purpose of applying the pre-
ceding sentence, such payment, to the extent of such sum payable for such support,
shall be considered a payment for such support."
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having been made of the portion for the support of the children, the entire
amount is income of the wife.0 ' This amendment, therefore, adopts the rule
declared by the district court in Bok v. Rothenlsies,62 and, consequently, what-
ever may be the final disposition of that case, the rule declared by the district
court would seem to prevail for all taxable years to which the new provisions
of the Code are applicable.
B. Alimony Trusts
In order to make the general rule applicable to alimony trusts two new
provisions were required. New Section 22 (k) includes within it the case
where a husband's alimony or separate maintenance obligation is discharged
through periodic payments attributable to property transferred in trust. Sec-
tion 22 (k), however, specifically applies only to alimony trusts created pur-
suant to the divorce or separate maintenance decree or pursuant to a written
agreement ','incident" to the divorce or separation. It thus does not apply to
the case of trusts which have been created prior to the divorce or legal sep-
aration. Moreover, as we have seen, under existing law, some alimony trusts
were subject to the limitations of Sections 166 and 167 of the Internal Revenue
Code, and, consequently, taxable to the husband even though they otherwise
would not be, and, also that under Section 22 (a) of the Code the doctrine of
Helvering v. Clifford has been declared applicable to certain other alimony
trusts in order to achieve the same result.m Therefore,. in orddr to bring any
and all alimony trusts within the general rule enunciated in Section 22 (k)
Congress added a new section, Section 171, to Supplement E (relating to
taxation of trusts, estates, etc.) of the Internal Revenue Code. Subsection
(a) of this new section, in part, provides, in sweeping terms, that there shall
'be included in the gross income of the wife, and not the husband, the amount
of the income of any alimony trust which she is entitled to receive, and which,
except for this new section, would have been taxable to the husband, regard-
less of Section 166, Section 167, or any other income tax provision.6 4 In view
6 1SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 86; H. R. REP. No. 2333, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 74.
6243 F. Supp. 377 (E. D. Pa. 1942). See note 46 and text supra.
63See notes 33 to 38 inclusive and text supra.
6456 STAT. 817, 26 U. S. C. § 171 (Sppp. 1942) (Income of an Estate or Trust in,
Case of Divorce, Etc.). This section reads in part as follows:"(a) Inclusion in Gross Income.-There shall be included in the gross income
of a wife who is divorced or legally separated under a decree of divorce or of sep-
arate maintenance the amount of the income of any trust'which such wife is entitled
to receive and which, except for the provisions bf this section, would be includible in
the gross income of her husband, and such amount shall not, despite section 166,
section 167, or any other provision of this chapter, be includible in the gross income
of such husband."
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of the broad and sweeping terms contained in this provision, coupled with
that of Section 22 (k), it would seem impossible to conceive of any case in
which the income of a bona fide trust paid to a wife who is divorced or legally
separated for her support and maintenance can hereafter be held taxable to
the husband. The "continuing obligation" rule of the Fitch, Fuller, and
Leonard cases, therefore, has been put finally to its well-merited death, and,
it is to be hoped, has been effectively buried.6 5
It is apparent, however, that, in substitution for the difficulties connected
with the former rule, the new provisions give rise to certain difficulties of
construction. For example, under the general rule enunciated in Section
22(k), quoted above, taxability, to the divorced wife of payments received
from an alimony trust is predicated principally upon whether such payments
come within the concept "periodic payments-attributable to property trans-
ferred (in trust or otherwise)." A "periodic payment" is an entirely new
concept which is not defined anywhere in the new provisions except in the
case of lump-sum settlements (discussed more particularly hereinafter) payable
in more than ten installments. As applied to trusts, does the term mean
"periodic" payments made from income of the trust? Or does it also include
payments made from the corpus of the trust in the event it is necessary to
invade corpus to make up an annual sum stipulated to be made in the trust
instrument? If so, is it limited only to such cases in which the corpus may
be invaded for a period exceeding ten years? If the term applies only to
income payments, does it apply to such payments made from income derived
6 5The alimony trust provisions of the new law, therefore, have the effect of reversing
for taxable years beginning after their effective date the line of lower court decisions
which, on the basis of the Fitch, Fuller, and Leonard cases, have held the income of
particular trusts taxable to the husband. See Havemeyer v. Helvering, 121 F. (2d) 454
(C. C. A. 2d, 1941), aff'g B. T. A. Memo. Op. Nov. 9,1940, Docket No. 98544; Thomp-
son v. Kavanaugh, 36 F. Supp. 263 (E. D. Mich. 1941); Henry Martyn Baker, 43
B, T. A. 1029 (1941) ; Murray Innes, 42 B. T. A. 93 (1940) ; and other cases cited in
note 32 supra. The new law thus brings such cases into conformity with the result of
the' cases which under the doctrine of the Fitch, Fuller, and Leonard cases held the income
of particular trusts taxable to the wife, for typical examples of which see: Bush v.
Commissioner, 133 F. (2d) 1005 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943), rev'g 45 B. T. A. 609 (1941);
Ingraham v. Commissioner, 119 F. (2d) 223 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941) ; Reginald B. Parsons,
44 B. T. A. 1142 (1941) ; Walter S. Halliwell, 44 B. T. A. 740 (1941), rev'd on. anwther
point, 131 F. (2d) 642 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942) ; Harry T. Nicolai, 42 B. T. A. 899 (1940),
aff'd, 126 F. (2d) 927 (C.'C. A. 9th, 1942) ; cf. note 32 supra.
Thus, under the new law the inc6me of a trust established to discharge a husband's
alimony obligation to his former wife is tdxable to her whether the husband has or has
not a "continuing obligation" to support her under local law. This is true, of course,
only so far as trust income is used to discharge an alimoily obligation of the husband.
To the extent that the trust income may be used to discharge other obligations of the
husband-grantor, however, he still may be held taxable. See Estate of William J. Gar-
land, 43 B. T. A. 731 (1941).
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by the trust in the form of tax-free interest from government bonds? These
and other questions remain to be resolved by judicial decision or further
congressional clarification. In the meantime, it should be noted that the
Treasury Department has ruled that the full amount of a "periodic" payment
made to a divorced wife is taxable to her regardless of whether made from
trust income or corpus, and, apparently, regardless of the period of possible
corpus invasion.65' Under this interpretation the total .amount subject to
income tax possibly may exceed the actual combined income of a husband and
wife for a given year. To illustrate: Suppose a husband's sole income in 1943
is $12,000 salary; that under an alimony trust created as an incident to a
New York divorce the wife is to receive $3,000 annually from income if
possible and, if not, out of corpus; and that the trust has income of only
$1,000 iii 1943. The husband in his 1943 return will be required to report
his $12,000 salary, and his wife the $1,000 of income received from the trust.
However, she receives $2,000 of trust corpus upon which she is also taxed un-
der the Regulations. Thus together they are taxed a total of $15,000 ($12,000
to the husband, $3,000 to the wife) whereas their actual combined income was
only $13,000. This obviously inequitable result is difficult to justify upon any
assumed intent of Congress, particularly in view of the background and
nature of the legislation.65b
Similarly to Section 22 (k), new Section 171 (a) excepts from its terms
so much of the income of a trust as the decree, or trust instrument provides,
in terms of an amount of money or a portion of such income, shall be payable
for the support of minor children of the husband. It also contains a provision
similar to that in Section 22 (k), discussed heretofore, that in case such income
is less than the sum or amount specified in the decree or instrument, then, to
the extent of the sum or amount which would be payable for the support of
such children out of the originally specified payment, such payment shall be
considered a payment for support. New Section 171 also makes the general
rules for accounting for the income of a trust or estate applicable to that part
of any periodic payment which is a distribution of the trust or estate and which"
is required under Section 22 (k) or Section 171 (a) to be included in the
income of the wife. Section 171 (b), in this respect, provides that the wife
entitled to receive the payment shall be considered as the beneficiary of the
6 5'U. S. Treas. Reg. 103 §§ 19.22(K)-l(b), 19.171-1 (a), 19.171-2, 19.23(u)-1.
65bIt is interesting to note in this connection that the proposed amendments were
recommended to Congress for adoption in order to relieve "hardships and inequities."
See Statement of Randolph Paul, Tax Adviser to the Secretary of the Treasury, Hearings
Before, the Committee on Ways and Means, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 92.
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trust. 6 "It is contemplated under these provisions that the trust or estate will
be entitled to a deduction in computing its net income for amounts required to
be included in the wife's income under Section 22 (k) or Section 171 to the
extent that such amounts are paid, credited, or to be distributed out of income
of the estate or trust for its taxable year.
67
C. Lumnp-Snm Settlenwnits
As has already been stated, the general rule is limited to "periodic pay-
ments." Since lump-sum settlements generally are not considered periodic
payments, they are not covered by Section 22 (k), and, accordingly, the
existing law, as previously outlined, continues as a general rule with re-
spect to such settlements. 8 One important exception to the existing law in
this respect, however, has been made, and that is that lump-sum settle-
ments payable in certain installments are subject to the section, and, accord-
ingly, taxable to the wife. It is generally provided in new Code Section
22 (k) that "installment payments discharging a part of an obligation the
principal sum of which is, in terms of money or property, specified in the
decree or instrument" shall be excluded from the concept of "periodic
payments." But it is specifically provided that there shall be included in
the concept of "periodic payments" an installment payment if the amount
thereof is not more than ten per cent of such principal sum, or if such principal
sum is required, by the terms of the decree or instrument, to be paid within
a period ending more than ten years from the date of such decree or instru-
ment. For this purpose, the portion of a payment of the principal sum which
is allocable to a period after the taxable year of the wife in which it is received
shall be considered an installment payment for the taxable year in which it is
received. To illustrate: If under the terms of the decree of divorce the
husband is to pay the wife $100,000 in installments of $5,000 a year for
twenty years, and in 1942, the husband pays the wife the regular $5,000
installment plus $10,000 in advance installments, or a total of $15,000, only
ten per cent of the principal sum (ten per cent of $100,000) or $10,000 is.
6056 STAT. 817, 26 U. S. C. § 171 (b) (Supp. 1942). This subsection provides:
"For the purposes of computing the net income of the estate or trust and the net
income of the wife described in section 22 (k) or subsection (a) of this section, such
wife shall be considered as the beneficiary specified in this supplement. A periodic
payment under section 22 (k) to any part of which the provisions of this supplement
are applicable shall be included in the gross income of the beneficiary, in the taxable
year in which under this supplement such part is required to be included."67S N. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 85. See also, H. R. REP. No. 2333,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 73.
sS5ee notes 39-43 and text supra.
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to be considered a periodic payment includible in the wife's income for 1942
and deductible by the husband for 1942. Thus no income or deduction results
under Section 22 (k) or Section 23 (u) from $5,000 of the advance installment
payment.
D. Life Insurance, Endowment, and Annuity Contracts
The full amount of periodic payments received under the circumstances
described in' Section 22 (k) is required to be included in the gross income of
the wife regardless of whether such payments "are attributable to property
placed in trust, to life insurance, endowment, or annuity contracts, or to any
other interest in property, or are paid directly or indirectly by the obligor
husband from his income or capital." 69 Possibly to make this result clear with
respect to those amounts received from life insurance, endowment, and annuity
contracts which otherwise would be excluded from gross income under Section
22 (b) (1) and (2) of the Code,70 Congress amended Section 22 (b) (2)
so as to provide that said subsection and subsection 22 (b) (1) "shall not
apply with respect to so much of a payment under a life insurance, endow-
ment or annuity contract, or any interest therein, as, under Section 22 (k)
is includible in gross income."1
7 1
This amendment will no doubt present some difficulty in determining what
payments from the sources referred to are includible in gross income under
Section 22 (k). It would seem clear that if, as in Pearce v. Commissioner,
72
in order to meet an alimpny obligation of $500 a month, the husband pur-
chases or assigns for the benefit of his former wife a commercial annuity
contract from a life insurance, or other company, paying such amount, the
full $500 a month received by the wife is includible in her income, and no
part of such amount is includible or deductible by the husband. The effect is
not so clear, however, with respect to life insurance paid to a divorced wife
by virtue of the death of the insured. If such insurance is paid in a lump sum
it would seem not taxable as income to the wife because it could not be con-
6 9SEN. RFi. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 84.
7053 STAT. 9 (1939), 26 U. S. C. § 22 (b) (1) and (2) (1940). Section 22 (b) (1)
provides generally that amounts received under a life insurance contract paid by reason
of the death of the insured, whether in a single sum or otherwise, shall be exempt from
income taxation. Section 22 (b) (2), on the other hand, provides generally that amounts
received other than by reason of the death of the insured, under a life insurance or
endowment contract, shall be included in income to the extent that they exceed the
aggregate premiums or consideration paid. It also provides that amounts received as
an annuity shall be included in income to the extent of three per cent of the aggregate
premiums or consideration paid therefor.
7156 STAT. 816, 26 U. S. C. 22 (b) (2) (Supp. 1942).
72315 U. S. 543, 62 Sup. Ct. 754 (1942). Cf.'notes 47 and 48 supra.
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sidered a "periodic payment" within the meaning of Section 22 (k). If such
insurance is payable in installments covering a period of more than ten years,
however, such payments appear to be taxable to the wife as "periodic, pay-
ments" within the meaning of Section 22 (k) and the Regulations of the
Treasury Department incorporating the new amendments so provide.73 It is
the writer's opinion that the same result should follow with respect to pre-
miums paid by the husband after the divorce or legal separation on life in-'
surance on his life payable to the divorced wife upon his death where the'
policy has been transferred to the wife, because such payments appear to be
embraced within the concept of "periodic payments." 74
In taxing the full proceeds of life insurance, heretofore ordinarily exempt
from income tax in the hands of a divorced widow although paid in install-
ments, the amendments again introduce a new inequity and a new discrim-
ination-that between widows who are divorced and those who are not. The
same observation, of course, may be made with respect to the taxation to a
divorced wife, under the above provisions, of the full proceeds derived from
endowment and annuity contracts without making any allowance for return
of capital.
E.' Miscellaneous Amendments
1. Dependency Credit.-As a necessary complement to the provisions in
new Sections 22 (k) and 171 (a) respecting taxability of amounts payable
73. S. Treas. Reg. 103 § 19.22 (b) (1)-i. The amendment appears to have been
designed to overrule, at least so far as alimony settlements are concerned, the decision in
Allis v. La Budde, et al:, 128 F. (2d) 838 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942), which held that install-
ment payments under an insurance policy on the life of her deceased husband payable
to the wife for ten years certain after her husband's death are exempt from tax under
§ 22 (b) (1) of the Revenue Act of 1934.
74Alimony settlements involving life insurance and annuity contracts open up many
new problems and give promise of being the most fruitful source of litigation under the
amendments. If a husband transfers a life insurance policy to his divorced wife, is the
value of the policy to be treated as a lump-sum settlement or as a gift? Or is the transfer
in the nature of a sale or exchange for a valuable consideration? If there is an irrevocable
"gift" of a policy, and the husband thereafter pays the premiums, each premium payment
may be a taxable gift. U. S. Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 2. Ordinarily where a life insurance
policy has been transferred for a valuable consideration, payments on account of the death
of the insured constitute income to the assignee to the extent that they exceed the sum
of the consideration paid by the assignee and the premiums and other amounts subse-
quently paid thereon by such assignee. Internal Revenue Code § 22 (b) (2). Does
this rule apply in case a policy providing for a single payment on death is transferred
to a wife as part of the alimony settlement? See Commissioner v. Mesta, 123 F. (2d)
986 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941), cert. den. 316 U. S. 655, 62 Sup. Ct. 1290 (1942). Are the full
proceeds of such a policy taxable if the insurance proceeds are payable in more than ten
yearly installments? Will an outright transfer of a policy result in the realization of a
gain by the husband? See Commissioner v. Mesta, .rupra. These and other questions
involving settlements of this nature will in all probability be involved in litigation.
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for the support of minor children, the dependency credit provisions of the
Code have been amended 75 so as to provide that payments made to a wife
for the support of minor children which are required to be included in her
gross income under Section 22 (k) or Section 171 "shall not be considered a
payment by her husband for the support of any dependent." Thus, where the
portion of such payments for the support of minor children is not specifically
designated, the wife, if actually contributing to the support of the children,
is entitled to the credit for dependents, unless, perhaps, it is established that,
independently of such amounts paid to the wife the husband or some one else
upon whom the children are financially dependent is actually the chief support
of such children. It appears that Congress also intended that similar rules
should govern as respects the element of financial support in determining
who is entitled to the head-of-family exemption. 6 There is nothing in the
Act, however, which specifically so provides.
2. Definitions.-The new provisions throughout refer to the husband as the
payor of the alimony payments and the wife as the recipient. A new definition
was, therefore, added by Section 120 (f) of the Act to Section 3797 (a) of
the Code (relating to definitions) providing that wherever appropriate the
terms "husband" and "wife" shall include "former husband" and "former
wife. '77 An important addition was made to this provision, however, to the
effect that, if the payments described in such sections are made by or on
behalf of the wife or former wife to the husband or former husband instead
of vice versa, wherever 'appropriate to the meaning of such sections, "the term
'husband' shall be read 'wife' and the term 'wife' shall be read 'husband'."
With this rather deft and humorous touch Congress, acknowledging the
realities of the situation, has provided that, at least so far as the income tax is
concerned, a divorced knight errant of an American heiress receiving "ali-
mony" payments from her, shall be considered a "wife" and, as such, taxable
accordingly.
78
3. Effective Dates.-The new amendments are, in general, made applicable
only with respect to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1941. How-
7556 STAT. 818, 26 U. S. C. § 25 (b) (2) (A) (Supp. 1942), and 56 STAT. 805, 26
U. S. C. § 401 (a) (2) (Supp. 1942).
76SEr. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 86; H. R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1942) 74.
756 STAT. 818, 26 U. S. C. § 3797 (a) (Supp. 1942).78With regard to the granting of alimony to the husband by the laws of some states,
see 2 VERNimR, A ME CAN FAMILY LAws (1932) 303-308; see also Comment, Alim;ony
Pendente Lite for Husbands (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 478.
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ever, if the first taxable year after December 31, 1941, of the husband does
not begin on the same date as the first taxable year, beginning after December
31, 1941, of the wife, such amendments will become applicable in the case
of the husband on the first day of the wife's first taxable year beginning after
December 31, 1941. 79
F. Coinstitutioizalit y
The constitutionality of the new provisions will no doubt be questioned in
view of the fact that this is the first time that Congress has passed any legis-
lation dealing specifically with the subject of the income taxation of alimony
and payments in lieu thereof. Reliance for the position that such pro-
visions are unconstitutional must necessarily be, placed upon Gould v. Gould,
which held that direct alimony payments made to a divorced wife are not
"income" within the meaning of the Income Tax Act of 1913.0 The Gould
case, therefore, is not authority for the position that alimony payments are
not "income" within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment."' The Court
did not hold that alimony was not "income" in the substantive sense, that is,
was not in its nature "income" to a recipient; rather, it held that it was not
"income" in the definitive sense, that is, as defined, or used, by Congress in
the Act of 1913. The case, therefore, is readily distinguishable.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court, in Helvering v. Fitch. 2 and
Helvering v. Fuller,3 perhaps in doubt of the wisdom of the rule it was
establishing in those cases, specifically pointed out that Congress, if it chose,
might legislate otherwise. In the Fuller case, the Court said:
"This is not to imply that Congress lacks authority to design a differ-
ent statutory scheme applying uniform standards for the taxation of
income of the so-called alimony trusts.
' '84
There would seem to be, therefore, little reason to doubt the constitutional
validity of the new provisions.
79Revenue Act 1942 § 120 (g), 56 STAr. 816, 26 U. S. C. § 3797 (a) (Supp. 1942).
8038 STAT. 114 (1913). As has been stated [see note 6 mepra and text], the real basis
for that decision appears to have been the desire on the part of the Court to avoid the
double tax burden which would necessarily have resulted frbm a contrary decision. See
also Lowndes, Community Income a d Alnony-Taxation under the Revenue Act of
1941 (1942) 20 TAXES 1, and Note (1918) 31 HARv. L. REv. 494.
81U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. XVI. It provides:
"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from what-
ever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without
regard to any census or enumeration."
82309 U. S. 149, 60 Sup. Ct. 427 (1940).
83310 U. S. 69, 60 Sup. Ct. 784 (1940).
841d. at 75, 60 Sup. Ct. at 787.
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It is, of course, arguable that alimony is not in its nature taxable income,
and, therefore, that Congress cannot by legislation make it so.
85 However,
there appears to be nothing in the nature of taxable income that would except
alimony from being embraced Within its definitive terms. Although, as Justice
Holmes once observed in this respect, there is "nothing to be gained by the
discussion of judicial definitions,"8 nevertheless, since alimony is merely the
"realization" by the divorced -wife of her previously unsevered interest,
resulting from the marriage relationship, in the property of her husband, it
comes squarely within the classic definition contained in Eisner v. Macomber :87
"Here we have the essential matter: not a gain accruing to capital,
not a growth or increment of value in the investment; but a gain, a profit,
something of exchangeable value proceeding from the property, severed
from the capital however invested or employed, and coming in, being
'derived,' that is, received or drawn by the recipient (the taxpayer) for
his separate use, benefit and disposal;-,that is income derived from
property."
It is true, of course, that payments made during the marriage by a husband
to his wife to be used for her maintenance are not considered as part of her
taxable income.88 But it does not follow that the substitute, which the law
allows her upon divorce, and which she may use in her sole discretion for any
purpose she desires, should deserve a similar tax immunity. The legal dis-
tinction, of course, is that she has "realized" income in the one case and not
in the other. "A great part of the major decisions of the Supreme Court
dealing with the concept of income, from Eisner v. Macomber to North
American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet may be considered as involving various
aspects of the problem of realization."8 9 It is also true that alimony payments
made to a wife may be exempt in her hands from attachment or garnishment
by her creditors.90 But, as pointed out by Mr. Randolph E. Paul, "this only
shows that alimony is even better than the ordinary type of income." 91
It is interesting to note in this connection that alimony is considered taxable
8 5Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189 (1920) ; Towne v. Eisner, 245
U. S. 418, 38 Sup. Ct. 158 (1918) ; 1 PAUL AND MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION (1934) 105.
86United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U. S. 1, 3, 52 Sup. Ct. 4 (1931).
87252 U. S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189 (1920).88See Rosa E. Burkhart, 11 B. T. A. 275 (1928) ; 0. D. 275, 1 CUM. BULL. 159 (1919);
U. S. Treas. Reg. 103 § 19.24-1.
8 9MAGILL, TAXABLE INCoMEr (1936) 153.90See 2 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS (1932) 259-325; Munson, Some Aspects
of the Nature of Permanent Alimony (1916) 16 COL. L. REv. 217.9151 HARV. L. REv. 1, n. 6.
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This review of the alimony and separate maintenance provisions of the
Revenue Act of 194294 against the inequitable and troublesome situation pre-
vailing before their enactment, leads to the inescapable conclusion that Con-
gress attempted to cover every conceivable payment that might be made as
alimony or in the nature of alimony and to subject all such payments to a
uniform rule. On the whole, this aim appears to have been achieved. That it
has can no doubt be attributed to the opportunity for careful consideration
over a period of more than a year which Congress obtained by postponing
the enactment of the proposals advanced in 1941.95 In view of the clearly
expressed intent of Congress, and the all-embracing character of the provi-
sions, and particularly in view of the fact that the treatment of all taxpayers
in a certain group on an equal basis is fundamental to a just tax system, it
is to be hoped that the courts, when called upon to construe the new provisions,
will do so in the light of the congressional intent to achieve equality of treat-
ment with respect to all taxpayers receiving, or paying, as the case may be,
alimony or separate maintenance payments.
It is regrettable that the new provisions in the case of annuity and endow-
ment settlements tax the full amount of the payments received by a divorced
wife from such sources, whereas in the case of other taxpayers; an allowance
is made for the amount of premiums or other consideration paid, and, in the
case of life insurance paid by reason of the death of the insured, tax such
insurance if paid to the divorced wife in certain installments, whereas such
payments are exempt in the hands of other beneficiaries. It well may be that
Congress did not intend this result, as the Senate Finance Committee Report
states that the change in Section 22 (b) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code
giving rise to this result was made for the purpose of correlating that provi-
sion with amendments made by other provisions of the Revenue Act of 1942.98
9 2
KONSTAim, THE LAW OF INCOME TAx (1940) 199, 217, 244, 341; Strangman, Alimony
and the British Income Tax (1941) 19 TAXEs 535.9 3 See J. A. L. Van Den Bosch, 26 B. T. A. 679 (1932).
9456 STAT. 816 (1942).
9 5 See note 1 supra.
9 6"Minor technical changes have been made in this section of your committee bill
(in subsection (d) which amends section 22 (b) (2), relating to annuities, etc.-) in
order to correlate the amendments made by this section with amendments made by sec-
tions 164 (b) and 144 (c) of the bill." SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1942) 87.
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The Treasury Department, however, in its Regulations under the new provi-
sions makes no allowance for return of capital in the stated situations. 7 The
result, of course, is inequitable and unjust and should be remedied by Congress.
Definition should also be made by Congress of the term "periodic payments,"
and of the word "decree," as used in Section 22 (k) of the Code in order to
make it clear that "decree" means an official pronouncement of any duly
authorized governmental authority, whether preliminary or final, and that a
"periodic payment" does not include any payment made from corpus or from
other than taxable income of an alimony trust.
97U. S. Treas. Reg. 103 §§ 19.22 (b) (1)-1; 19.22 (b) (2) (A)-4.
